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In a free-swinging Commentary article of 1956, Daniel Bell attacked a 
style of thinking about the bourgeois urban-industrial world that he called 
" the theory of the mass society." As Bell glossed it, this theory alleged that 
the acids of modernity—chiefly technological advances—had eaten away 
the social bonds, faiths and authorities that once unified lives and gave 
them meaning. Society became a vast impersonal marketplace, compelling 
individuals to become speculators in constantly fluctuating values and 
roles. "Because of all this ," wrote Bell, summarizing his antagonists' 
position, " the individual loses a coherent sense of self. His anxieties 
increase. There issues a search for new faiths. The stage is thus set for the 
charismatic leader, the secular messiah, who, by bestowing upon each 
person the semblance of necessary grace . . . supplies a substitute for the 
older unifying belief that the mass society has destroyed."1 Bell called this 
"probably the most influential social theory in the Western world today." 
What the mass society theorists shared, in Bell's view, was less a 
coherent analysis of bourgeois society than a grudge against a particular 
bourgeois society, that of the United States, born of ancient Old World 
resistances to the charms of the New. It cannot have been coincidental that 
Bell named among the mass society theorists only Europeans, barely 
acknowledging the work of David Riesman and altogether ignoring the 
writings of other homegrown critics. The distempers of Ortega y Gasset, 
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Mannheim, Arendt, et. al. descended, said Bell, from the horror of cultural 
and political leveling that had first seized European thinkers when the 
Bastille fell. The mass society theorists were only the most recent defenders 
of "an aristocratic cultural tradition . . . and a doubt that the large mass of 
mankind can ever become truly educated or acquire an appreciation of 
culture."2 
Bell met these alien Cassandras with a spirited apology for the mass 
society, and especially for its American variant. The pluralism and 
freedom that flourished in the mass society more than compensated for 
what it might have taken away from the fullness of human relationships, 
Bell argued. Mass participation in culture was the inevitable concomitant 
of democratic citizenship and rising standards of living, and none of these 
things entailed any necessary leveling of standards. But Bell moved beyond 
these predictable affirmations to assail the basic assumptions of the mass 
society critique. Citing the vigor of ethnic subcultures and voluntary 
associations in the United States, Bell questioned the very existence of the 
rootless mass that was said to have conquered the urban-industrial 
landscape. He concluded by invoking the Turner-Louis Hartz portrait of 
an American "born free" and defying European categories, "probably the 
first large society in history to have change and innovation 'built into' its 
culture."3 
Though Bell recounted the history of the ideas he rejected, he said 
nothing about the antecedents of his own ideas. Five years later one of his 
students, Leon Bramson, corrected Bell's oversight in a book that identi-
fied a distinctively upbeat pattern of American notions about collective 
behavior that extended back to the turn of the century. According to 
Bramson European analyses of crowd pathology encountered American 
resistance long before Bell issued his patriotic counterattack. "Lacking a 
feudal tradition . . . and possessing from the beginning a liberal-demo-
cratic tradition, the United States does not provide fertile soil for the 
development of an anti-democratic social psychology of crowds." Thus 
American sociologists who first examined collective behavior turned 
European disparagements upside down, discerning constructive potentials 
in crowds and masses.4 
The first interpretations of the mass society in America were developed 
by psychologists and sociologists in the period between the World Wars. 
The crucial theoretical achievement of this generation was to evolve the 
concept of the mass, a dispersed and passive body of uprooted individuals, 
from the pre-Wo rid War I concept of the crowd, a physically united and 
active throng. Following Leon Bramson, I will argue that these writers 
perceived in collective behavior a principle of perpetual social renewal, 
virtually a sociological equivalent of Turner 's frontier. However it was no 
promise of revitalized democracy, but rather a vision of the mass as mass, 
that intrigued American writers during the 1920s and 1930s. The alleged 
qualities of the mass society that repelled European critics and Daniel 
Bell—its cultural vacuousness, its amorphousness, its restlessness—were 
the very qualities that recommended it to the interwar generation. In 
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America the mass was initially valued for creating a pliable social solidarity 
that could be painlessly mastered by progressive elites. Pioneering inter-
preters of the mass society approached it in much the same spirit that de 
Tocqueville received democracy, as a kind of society that "would not be 
stationary," but whose wayward "impulses" could "be regulated and 
made progressive."5 
Early investigations of collective behavior grew out of conservative 
ideologues' morbid fascination with revolutionary mobs at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The Italian criminologist Scipio Sighele, the French 
criminologist Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, polymath prophet of 
Western decadence, were indebted to Hippolyte Taine's Origins of Contem-
porary France, a bitterly anti-Jacobin work that stressed the role played by 
berserk street crowds at the critical moments of the French Revolution. 
These writers had lurid memories of the Paris Commune as well. From 
such materials, together with research demonstrating the irrationality of 
human motives, Le Bon, Tarde and Sighele devised a body of generaliza-
tions about collective behavior that took the name "crowd psychology."6 
The crowd psychologists held that physical gatherings generated an 
irresistible "contagion" of emotions, dissolving personalities into a sug-
gestible and vicious "crowd mind." 7 It was chiefly crowds of unrespecta-
bles—the sans culottes of '89, the spectators at the guillotine in '93, the 
proletarian revolutionaries of '48 and '71—that worried the crowd psychol-
ogists. They denounced working-class mobs as the indispensable comman-
dos of democracy and socialism in modern history. 
But the concerns of the crowd psychologists extended beyond the literal 
crowd to the social conditions that spawned it. Tarde and Le Bon held that 
the mob represented an inflammation of enduring qualities of modern 
urban-industrial populations: their uprootedness; the weakness of their 
allegiances to traditional institutions; their exposure to jangling barrages of 
sensual stimulations; their consequent excitability. The actual mob sym-
bolized what Le Bon called "the advent to power of the masses." This 
crowd-society was no less ignoble than the riotous crowds it sometimes 
spilled into the Paris streets. But it could not be wished away. Like it or not, 
Le Bon declared, in this "era of crowds" the masses constituted "the last 
surviving sovereign force."8 
The crowd-society commanded respect for another reason. If it could 
be cured of its susceptibility to revolutionary diseases, the crowd-society 
could perform a salutary purifying function. According to Le Bon, history 
assigned to the aroused masses the mission of destroying worn-out 
civilizations. By chastening egos and cancelling antiquated loyalties, the 
crowd was capable of releasing "latent forces in the inner being of 
nations." Given the proper direction, crowds could rise to acts of heroism 
and patriotism that surpassed the spiritual resources of their individual 
members.9 
The riotousness of mobs was deceptive, Le Bon suggested, because the 
modern masses were fundamentally conservative and craved strong lead-
ership. The secret of taming the crowd-society lay in disrupting the 
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"contagion" of emotions and suggestions that bound crowd members to 
one another. If the attention of a crowd could be directed outward and 
fastened on responsible leaders, its energies could be harnessed. "A 
knowledge of the psychology of crowds," wrote Le Bon, "is to-day the last 
resource of the statesman who wishes not to govern them—that is 
becoming a very difficult matter—but at any rate not to be too much 
governed by them." 1 0 
In 1898 Gabriel Tarde offered further assurance to those who would 
master the masses. Modern means of communication were rapidly replac-
ing "the more primitive congregation of crowds" with a new, more 
cerebral kind of collectivity, the public.11 The public was unified less by 
subrational suggestions than by ideas conveyed by the press. What made it 
more rational and pacific than the crowd was the physical dispersion of its 
members, which prevented any infectious sharing of suggestions. In 
Tarde's phrase the public displayed "contagion without contact"—enough 
interaction to unify its members, but not enough to inflame them. In effect 
Tarde's "publ ic" was a crowd purged of its social poisons, a crowd that 
was easily governable. 
The United States bred an original crowd psychologist of its own. Boris 
Sidis, a Russian political refugee who earned a psychology doctorate under 
William James at Harvard, began in 1895 to expound a theory that 
stressed human suggestibility and the hypnotic origins of crowd behavior. 
By 1898, perhaps in an effort to one-up Le Bon and Tarde, Sidis was 
proclaiming that "society in general and democracy in particular" 
generate mob phenomena. Any restraints on personal freedom tended to 
generate "mental epidemics." Applying his thesis to the United States, 
Sidis adduced as proof of the rising incidence of irrational collective 
behavior America's mineral rushes, lynch mobs, protest movements, Wall 
Street panics and the crazes for bicycling and football.12 
One of the scholars who retailed Sidis' ideas was E. A. Ross, probably 
the most widely read social scientist of his day and among the first to 
ponder the social condition that would later be dubbed "the mass society." 
Ross recoiled from the specter of the crowd in an article on "The Mob 
Mind" of 1897. Borrowing from Sidis, Ross described the insidious 
"mental contagion" of the street mob as a trait of most city-dwellers. 
Modern communications constantly stoked the nervous suggestibility that 
caused collective behavior. Diagnosing the resulting "mob mind" as a sort 
of psychosis, Ross prescribed a therapy of liberal education and "Self-
Reliance": "We must hold always to a sage Emersonian individualism, 
that . . . shall brace men to stand against the rush of the mass ." 1 3 
Yet in this same article Ross sketched the view of history that would 
lead him and later American commentators to think better of the crowd. 
For according to Ross " the mob mind" was only a repugnant side effect of 
the progress set in motion by the French Revolution. Once the masses had 
slavishly imitated their ancestors: now, more self-confident, they had 
turned to imitating one another. Seen in this light the crowd might be 
repellant, but at least it represented an improvement on ancestor-worship. 
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The decade of burgeoning immigration, progressive politics and 
explorations of the unconscious that followed 1897 drew Ross away from 
Emersonian maxims and Sidis' paranoia, to the more practical programs 
of Tarde and Le Bon. Ross' Social Psychology of 1908 repeated familiar dicta 
regarding the mental inferiority of the crowd. "Essentially atavistic and 
sterile, " he wrote, " the crowd ranks as the lowest of the forms of human 
association." Now, however, Ross took comfort in the affirmations of 
crowd psychology. Echoing Le Bon, Ross noted that crowds had often been 
agents of progressive change. More tellingly, Ross gladly embraced 
Tarde's distinction between crowd and public. Ours is " the era of 
publics," he proclaimed, and the public was more a creature of reason, less 
subject to "accidental leaders," than the crowd. A public could be securely 
entrusted to guidance by an educated elite, " a handful of well-ballasted 
college men and women." In 1908 Ross' recommended "prophylactics 
against the mob mind" merged American progressivism with French 
crowd psychology. The trick was to wrest influence over the masses away 
from "the fanatical and impassioned" and bestow it on "the intel-
l igent."1 4 
While Ross labored to rationalize the regime of crowd and public, 
others rushed to capitalize on it. Walter Dill Scott, a pioneer of advertising 
psychology at Northwestern University, hailed the crowd as a bonanza for 
public speakers in a manual published in 1906. Following Sidis, Scott held 
that "our most important actions are performed and most sacred concep-
tions are reached by means of the merest suggestions." But Scott 
converted Sidis' apprehensions into a confident technology for oratorical 
mastery. Since the crowd intensifies suggestibility, Scott taught, it is the 
speaker's ideal audience. "The orator's influence is in direct proportion to 
the homogeneity of the audience. The orator who is able to weld his 
audience into a homogeneous crowd was already won his hardest fight. The 
difficult task is not to convince and sway the crowd, but to create it. " 1 5 A young 
professor at the Baltimore School of Commerce, Dale Carnagey, put the 
same point even more forcefully. In a volume titled The Art of Public 
Speaking, co-authored with J . Berg Esenwein in 1915, Carnagey wrote, 
"Crowds have not changed . . . in a thousand years and the one law holds 
for the greatest preacher and the pettiest stump-speaker—you must fuse 
your audience or they will not warm to your message."1 6 
Nothing acted more powerfully to "fuse audiences," Carnagey and 
Esenwein suggested, than patriotic passions. They cited as illustrations the 
musicals of George M. Cohan, "making psychology practical and profit-
able" by deftly deploying national symbols; and the French Army at the 
Marne, charging "as one m a n " with the Marseillaise on their lips.17 Two 
years later the arts of swaying anonymous bodies of auditors and readers 
became instruments of national policy. The Committee on Public Informa-
tion (CPI), Wilson's war propaganda agency, conferred on the study of the 
crowd a legitimacy that went far beyond the catchpenny opportunism of 
Scott and Carnagey. The War campaigns to mobilize public opinion 
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taught lessons that analysts and manipulators of mass audiences were to 
honor for the next two decades. 
The CPI aspired to do precisely what engineers of crowd-behavior 
advised, to monopolize the attention of its audiences. The agency not only 
pumped propaganda into every existing channel of communication but 
invented an array of new ones. Several CPI devices were calculated to 
bypass established social structures and thus to set up the direct rapport 
that was deemed vital to managing crowds. The National School Service, a 
biweekly pamphlet sent to every public school teacher in the nation, was 
designed to deliver " a message that went without fail into every home ," 
including homes that harbored anti-War opinions. The ' T o u r Minute 
M e n , " 75,000 amateur orators, were encouraged to take advantage of the 
special receptivity to persuasion that supposedly prevailed among movie 
audiences. A CPI official noted that "every night eight to ten million 
people of all classes . . . meet in the moving picture houses of this country, 
and among them are many of [the] silent ones who do not read or attend 
meetings but who must be reached." The same enthusiasm moved CPI 
Chairman George Creel to endorse a scheme to install talking machines in 
thousands of public "speaking stations," to which inspirational addresses 
would be sent from studios in New York. According to the promoter, 
"Every week some master Personality will speak directly to great masses of 
people on the momentous questions of this, the Greatest Crisis in the 
history of the human race ." 1 8 
Creel and his lieutenants dissociated the CPI from vigilante mob 
actions against German-Americans and dissidents. Yet in Creel's account 
of the CPI published just after the War, he acknowledged that the agency 
had aspired to create "no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the 
justice of America's cause that should weld the people of the United States 
into one white-hot mass instinct with fraternity, courage, and deathless 
determination. ' '1 9 
A few voices wished a plague on both the spontaneous and the 
organized collectivities that took their sanction from the War effort. Boris 
Sidis, whose son was arrested for taking part in a "Red Flag" demonstra-
tion, denounced the War as the latest and bloodiest of "mental epidemics" 
in Western history, the product of a "social trance" induced by "brilliant 
parades, hypnotizing oratory, and by all the artifices of a militant 
chauvinist press ." 2 0 A new American essay in crowd psychology, pub-
lished by the adult educator Everett Dean Martin in 1920, warned that 
"the habit of crowd-making is daily becoming a more serious menace to 
civilization." Crossing Le Bon with Freud and Nietzsche, Martin de-
scribed patriotic wardances, the Red Scare and the Klan as collective 
psychoses that dredged up repressed desires. "In other words," wrote 
Martin, "<2 crowd is a device for indulging ourselves in a kind of temporary insanity 
by all going crazy together.'" Martin saw no redeeming value in collective 
action. " I am sick of this oozing democracy," Martin declared. "There 
must be something crystalline and insoluble left in democratic America. 
Somewhere there must be people with sharp edges that cut when they are 
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pressed too hard. . . . They are the hope of democracy, these infusible 
ones."2 1 
But there were few such spasms of revulsion. The English writer 
Wilfred Trotter taught principles that American analysts of collective 
behavior preferred to learn from the War experience. According to Trotter 
the suggestibility of people in mobs is merely an intensification of the 
"herd suggestibility" that is " a necessary quality of every normal mind ." 
Trotter's emphasis on the propensity to conform to the " h e r d " severed 
conventional equations of suggestibility with disorder. Far from being the 
combustible stuff of riots and revolutions, Trotter held, the herd instinct is 
the essential mortar of standing institutions, the conservative motive that 
rules " the great class of normal, sensible, reliable middle age ," those who 
make up "the backbone of the States." Trotter professed personal 
sympathy with "sensitive" individuals who bucked the herd. Yet he 
acknowledged that in war the herd instinct "gives smoothness of working, 
energy, and enterprise to the whole national machine," building morale 
while minimizing egoist interferences.22 
The proven potency of CPI methods for molding opinion combined 
with growing confidence in new communications media to give fresh 
appeal to the ideas of Le Bon, Tarde and Trotter. During the 1920s 
American theorists redefined as virtues crowd attributes that had been 
commonly treated as scourges a decade earlier. Now the crowd's primi-
tivism, its lack of culture and stable structure became a promise of its 
manageability; now the crowd's volatility was reinterpreted as its capacity 
for rapid adaptation to new environments. 
The reconstruction of crowd concepts advanced along two broad fronts, 
both of which had been reconnoitered by pre-War writers. Taking Le Bon 
as his master, Robert Ezra Park conceived of crowd phenomena as the 
essential crucibles of modern social progress. Meanwhile Floyd Allport and 
others were elaborating Gabriel Tarde's proposition that the crowd was 
giving way to aggregates that lacked the crowd's menace but retained its 
dynamism. 
Park was an unlikely disciple of Le Bon. The French writer was racist 
and reactionary: Park served for seven years as secretary to Booker T. 
Washington and held generally progressive political views. Yet in a 
doctoral dissertation titled " T h e Crowd and the Public" that Park 
submitted to the University of Heidelberg in 1904, he deviated in only 
peripheral ways from the characterization of the crowd offered by Le 
Bon.23 In 1921 Park reaffirmed his dependence on Le Bon in the landmark 
textbook that he co-authored with Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the 
Science of Sociology. The section on collective behavior in that text included 
two long excerpts from Le Bon and preserved intact all of his emphases on 
the crowd's irrationality, its primitivism and its "mental unity."2 4 As late 
as 1941 Park paid tribute to Le Bon for having given "sociological 
speculation and research . . . a new orientation."23 
Le Bon's crucial insight, for Park, was his identification of the crowd as 
the historical instrument that razed decayed regimes to clear the ground for 
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new ones. But Le Bon's crowds were the wrecking crews of history, the 
destructive agents in the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations. Park gave a 
distinctively progressive twist to Le Bon's thesis. In his Introduction to the 
Science of Sociology Park characterized the crowd as a middle phase in " the 
order of institutional evolution," the phase that converted "social unrest" 
into mass movements and eventually into new institutions. Park's defi-
niton of collective behavior plainly announced the bent of his ideas: social 
unrest, crowds and other such phenomena had to be understood as " the 
processes by which societies are disintegrated into their constituent 
elements and the processes by which these elements are brought back 
together again into new relations to form new organizations and new 
societies."26 
Precisely how ephemeral crowds give birth to creative social move-
ments Park left to others to explain.27 He shied away from the ready Le 
Bonian answer, that mesmerizing leadership effects the transition. But the 
very vagueness of his formulations helped Park to sustain his positive-
mindedness. The disorderliness of "psychic epidemics" had to be viewed, 
he insisted, as the price of progress; "social unrest may be, therefore, a 
symptom of heal th."2 8 The emotional contagion that was the hallmark of 
the crowd signified a providential engine of change. Even the anomic 
qualities of the crowd-member proclaimed his release from traditional 
loyalties, guaranteeing his responsiveness to new experience. 
While Park and his students were rehabilitating the crowd with 
selective doses of Le Bon, psychologists were beginning to distinguish 
between crowds and the bodies of dispersed individuals who made up the 
audiences of the mass media. Floyd Allport took a long step toward 
establishing this critical distinction in his Social Psychology of 1924, a text 
that helped to reorder its field in the same way that Park's reordered 
sociology. Dismissing all notions of a collective "crowd-consciousness," 
Allport sought to explain collective behavior in terms of individual 
psychology.29 What caused collective behavior, in Allport's view, was no 
irrational suggestibility, but rather the "impression of universality," a 
property of belief. The crowd-member behaves as he does because he 
believes that others share his feelings and convictions. But because belief 
and imagination are the mainsprings of collective action, Allport held, 
literal congregation is not necessary to produce the conformity associated 
with crowds. The impression of universality can cause even widely 
separated individuals to act in concert. "Psychologically speaking," 
Allport concluded, " 'the public' means to an individual an imagined 
crowd in which (as he believes) certain opinions, feelings, and overt 
reactions are universal."3 0 Later what Allport called "publ ic" would be 
renamed " m a s s " and understood as a body whose cardinal characteristic 
was the separateness of its members. 
Wartime regimentation, the Red Scare and post-War strikes disturbed 
Allport, who praised Martin's despairing book on crowds. The crowd was 
primitive, Allport agreed, because it masked destructive drives that 
civilization normally held in check. But Allport's emphasis on the impres-
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sion of universality led him to conclude that contemporary furies of 
collective behavior were neither inevitable nor likely to continue. For 
crowds were more ephemeral than publics; and since the public was an 
"impression" dwelling in individual minds, rather than a product of 
ricocheting emotions, it could be more readily controlled and educated. 
The impression of universality that today fed crowd abuses could tomor-
row be applied to the ends of " t rue socialization."31 The public appeared 
all the more virtuously manageable to Allport because of the way it 
contrasted with the crowd. Lacking the crowd's inwardness and contagion, 
incapable of organizing itself, the public owed its unity to objects of 
attention lying outside itself. In short the public—Allport's term for the 
mass—was ordinarily inert, but it was safely movable by those who could 
touch its latent desires. 
Park and Allport domesticated the phenomena of collective behavior by 
confining them in theoretical abstractions. But their method was faithful to 
the substance of their views: crowds and masses were conceived as forces 
that turned societies back into their primary elements, cancelling concrete 
structures that stood in the way of renewal. Gone from the discussions of 
Park and Allport were the images of violence and leveling that had colored 
most pre-War treatments of the crowd. In their place appeared implica-
tions of splendid indeterminacy and potential. 
Among observers of the crowd the ebullient E. L. Bernays stood at a far 
remove from these academics. In a cloud of puffery that included two 
books published during the 1920s, Bernays embraced the mass as the 
precondition of public relations, the new trade that he toiled to make into a 
profession. Bernays' pretensions moved him to search for the theoretical 
premises of publicity work in the writings of Trotter, Martin, Walter 
Lippmann and others. What resulted was a serviceable "philosophy" of 
the mass society that connected academic theory with the hustling arts of 
mass communications. 
Bernays laid down the axiom that "The crowd is a state of mind which 
permeates society and its individuals at almost all t imes."3 2 "Crowd 
psychology and herd reaction" accounted for the great majority of 
judgments on topics that lay beyond the immediate ken of modern citizens, 
and it was this fact that "gives the public relations counselor the 
opportunity for his most important work."3 3 It is important to note that 
Bernays used the word "crowd" to denote what Tarde and Allport labeled 
the "public, ' ' what would later be termed the "mass. ' ' For it was crucial to 
Bernays' conception of the prevalent "crowd-mind" that it referred to the 
malleability and passivity of the mass, in contrast to the activism of the 
literal crowd. 
According to Bernays the condition of the mass generated an appetite 
for symbols and stereotypes that permitted " the average mind to possess a 
much larger number of impressions than would be possible without them. " 
Instead of consuming the individual, the mass society made his loyalties 
more labile and distributed them more freely. It was the 
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inconsistency of the average man's mental, social, and psychologi-
cal commitments which makes possible the gradual change from 
one state of affairs or from one state of mind to another. . . . This is 
one of the most powerful forces making for progress in society 
because it makes for receptivity and open-mindedness. 
Bernays surmised that only emergencies forged the total allegiances of 
mobs. In unpressured peacetime the mass "state of mind" paradoxically 
made for tolerance and educability by dividing people into a variety of 
groups, no one of which monopolized its members' attention. Bernays 
concluded that the receptivity "which results from the inconstancy of 
individual commitments may be accelerated and directed by conscious 
effort."34 
In a book titled simply Propaganda that appeared in 1928, Bernays 
unabashedly acknowledged implications of crowd psychology that aca-
demic analysts either denied or ducked. Left to themselves, Bernays wrote, 
the masses would be paralyzed by the blizzards of suggestions generated by 
advertisers, broadcasters and other special pleaders. Only an "invisible 
government" could "sift the data and high-spot the outstanding issues," 
providing the "organization and focusing [that] are necessary to orderly 
life. " Now adding Le Bon to a list of authorities that included Trotter and 
Lippmann, Bernays wondered whether, "If we understand the mecha-
nisms and motives of the group mind, is it not possible to control and 
regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing i t?" 3 5 
But understanding the group mind was not enough. "Invisible govern-
ment" would require powerful implements—implements that had been 
providentially supplied, Bernays pointed out, by the new electric media. 
"As civilization has become more complex and as the need for invisible 
government has been increasingly demonstrated, the technical means have 
been invented and developed by which opinion may be regimented." 
Tarde had described newspapers as the central nervous system of the 
public. By the 1920s radio had enormously expanded the means by which 
"ideas can be spread rapidly and even instantaneously over the whole of 
America."3 6 The unique capacities of radio provided new grounds for 
believing that the mass society could be safely mastered. 
Through the early 1930s studies of radio's effects were limited to 
primitive measurements of audience sizes and advertising success. Social 
scientists seemed to lack both the data-gathering capacity and the curiosity 
to inquire into the larger social consequences of broadcasting. Finally in 
1935 Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport, social psychologists with 
good entré into the radio industry, made the first attempt to "map out . . . 
the mental world created by radio ." They surmised that radio, reaching 
audiences "of a size hitherto undreamed of," would play havoc "with the 
traditional theories of crowd formation and of group thinking."3 7 Actually 
Cantril and Allport's findings tended to confirm earlier speculation 
regarding the manageability of masses. 
Following Floyd Allport, Gordon's brother, Cantril and Allport consid-
ered the "impression of universality" the psychological glue of large 
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collectivities. Because of its capacity to make the individual listener believe 
"that others are thinking as he thinks and are sharing his emotions," radio 
"more than any other medium of communication, is capable of forming a 
crowd mind among individuals who are physically separated from one 
another." Cantril and Allport ascribed the spellbinding success of Roose-
velt, Long and Coughlin to their skill in creating a vivid impression of 
universality among millions who had little more in common than receivers 
tuned to the same frequencies. Coughlin's accomplishments seemed 
especially significant because unlike Long and European demagogues, who 
had built bases of support before they took to the air, the radio priest had 
created "exclusively on the basis of radio appeal an immensely significant 
political crowd." This achievement indicated that "the fostering of the 
mob spirit must be counted as one of the by-products of radio ." 3 8 
But the burden of Cantril and Allport's research was to distinguish the 
docility of radio audiences, which were mass forms, from the waywardness 
of crowds. Because " the contagion of personal contact" played no part in 
the collectivities gathered by radio broadcasts, the situation of the radio 
listener differed fundamentally from that of the listener in a meeting or 
street throng. In fact Cantril and Allport implied that broadcasting 
actually diminished the incidence of literal crowds and replaced them with 
mass phenomena. In other words, by dispersing audiences, and by 
permitting communicators to monopolize their attention, radio created the 
conditions that would come to be known as the mass society. Physically 
removed from the speaker, separated from one another, radio auditors 
became "less emotional and more critical, less crowdish and more 
individualistic." For this reason, Cantril and Allport observed, radio is 
"ill-adapted for producing unpremeditated crowd behavior," and rather 
poorly suited to the ends of dictators.39 
Compared with face-to-face communication, broadcasting '"seems to 
have a slightly dulling effect upon higher mental processes. " But Cantril and 
Allport noted that this numbing had its uses. In words that recalled 
Trotter's remarks on the stabilizing effects of herd instinct, Cantril and 
Allport called radio "perhaps our chief potential bulwark of social 
solidarity," a "standardizing influence" that tends " to counteract disin-
tegrative forces." In effect "the new mental world" limned by Cantril and 
Allport was another cheerful assessment of the mass society, a detoxified 
crowd that could be bent to the purposes of enlightened leaders.40 
The nascent American theory of the mass society also drew indirect 
support from the work of market resarchers and opinion pollsters. 
Important links between this work and academic social science were forged 
by Paul Lazarsfeld, who fled the Nazis to settle in the United States in 
1934.41 Abandoning the study of community structures that had until then 
preoccupied empirical sociology in both Europe and America, Lazarsfeld 
devoted his career to dissecting the "act ion" of individual consumers and 
voters by sampling techniques. Setting aside curiosity about cultural 
determinants of behavior, Lazarsfeld sought to analyze actions into 
discrete "phases" that persuaders could influence. In practice this focus on 
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dissecting individual choices led Lazarsfeld to portray modern citizens as 
people on the loose, released from traditional social constraints and 
receptive to the mass media. This orientation was highly congenial to 
advertisers, for whom Lazarsfeld performed dozens of market studies. In 
1934 Lazarsfeld argued that " the formal analysis of the act of purchase" 
yielded results "which were interesting for the theoretical psychologist and 
worth money to the business m a n . " 4 2 Three years later Lazarsfeld joined 
Hadley Cantril and Frank Stanton in setting up the Office of Radio 
Research, a pioneering center of mass communications studies.43 
In 1939 Herbert Blumer, a pupil of Robert Park, published a 
systematic statement of the progressive consensus on crowd and mass that 
had evolved since the First World War. With a bow to Le Bon's "classic 
work," Blumer reaffirmed all of Park's emphases on the cleansing and 
liberating functions of the crowd. "With the breakdown of his previous 
personal organization," Blumer wrote, the man of the crowd 
is in a position to develop new forms of conduct and crystallize a 
new personal organization along new and different lines. In this 
sense, crowd behavior is a means by which the breakup of the social 
organization and personality structure is brought about, and at the 
same time is a potential device for the emergence of new forms of 
conduct and personality.44 
The "mill ing" of crowd-members, the "contagion" of their emotions, 
were described by Blumer as processes that were in themselves asocial, but 
that prepared the ground for political and religious reformations. 
Blumer's account of the " m a s s " represented the first attempt to define 
the dispersed crowd since Tarde introduced his conception of the "publ ic" 
in 1898. In effect, Blumer's notion of the mass gathered together all the 
speculative strands by which earlier American writers had sought to 
rationalize the atomizing results of urban-industrial change. According to 
Blumer the mass was heterogeneous and anonymous, an aggregation that 
like the crowd was "devoid of the features of a society or community." It 
was a heap of separated individuals. But unlike the crowd, the mass lacked 
"interaction or exchange of experience" among its members, and thus 
lacked the crowd's unity. Therein lay the advantages of the mass. For 
mass-members were "detached and alienated individuals who face objects 
or areas of life which are interesting, but which are also puzzling and not 
easy to understand and order." Yet in contrast to crowd-members, who 
were drawn inward to contemplate their own conduct, mass-members were 
left unhomogenized, in possession of themselves and looking outward. 
Emptied of traditional parochial identities, mass-members were prone to 
turn, in Blumer's words, "toward a wider universe, toward expectations," 
to influences beyond "local cultures and groups." In short the mass as 
Blumer sketched it resembled nothing so much as an ideal market, a sea of 
consumers wanting to be sold, or a patient electorate, waiting to be 
polled.45 
But in 1939 Blumer was articulating a consensus about the benign 
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potentials of collective behavior that was fast unraveling. The fondness of 
European authoritarians for Le Bonian precepts forced American writers 
to reexamine the implications of crowd psychology. Scholars studied with 
horrified admiration the rallies at Nuremberg, Goebbels' use of radio 
propaganda and the demogogic virtuosity of Father Coughlin. The 
psychologist Ellis Freeman identified Hitler as the modern master of 
crowd-making techniques. Hadley Cantril analyzed the role of crowd 
behavior in generating such malignant movements as Naziism or such 
feckless ones as the vogues of Townsend and Father Divine. Cantril and 
other psychologists joined the board of the Institute for Propaganda 
Analysis, founded in 1937 to combat anti-democratic demagoguery.46 
During the 1940s empirical researchers' "rediscovery of the primary 
group" further eroded the progressive conceptions of crowd and mass. 
Fresh studies of mass communications effects indicated that the media were 
less sovereign, and their audiences less passive and atomized, than had 
been previously supposed. Paul Lazarsfeld reported in 1942 that broad-
casting was most effective when it supplemented the activities of independ-
ent groups like farm bureaus or listening circles. A study by Lazarsfeld of 
the 1940 presidential race, published in 1944 as The People's Choice, showed 
that local, personal influences weighed more heavily than radio and 
newspaper campaigns in determining voting decisions. Blumer continued 
to insist that voting, shopping and attending movies were "mass actions"; 
but by 1948 even Blumer was implicitly questioning the accuracy of the 
mass society thesis when he criticized opinion pollsters for presuming 
society to be "only an aggregation of separate individuals." Five years 
later Eliot Freidson summarized the case against Blumer's 1939 definition 
of the mass. Recent findings, said Freidson, implied that "the member of 
the mass audience selects his mass communications content under a good 
deal of pressure and guidance from his experience as a member of social 
groups . . . and that mass communications have been absorbed into the 
social life of the local groups." 4 7 
The moral of the new evidence, however, was not that the mass 
audience could not be managed, but rather that its management required 
tactical subtleties that had been glimpsed by only the shrewdest of earlier 
writers. One of these was E. L. Bernays, who as early as 1923 had cited the 
necessity of enlisting local opinion leaders in publicity campaigns.48 
According to Bernays it was the solidarity of local groups that made mass 
opinion easily manipulable, for once one persuaded a group's leaders, the 
group "automatically" fell into line.49 Paul Lazarsfeld repeated Bernays' 
insight when twenty years later he conjectured that the success of Father 
Coughlin reflected " the network of local organizations which provided the 
necessary face-to-face complement or sounding-board for his radio 
speeches."50 This line of implicit advice for mass communicators culmi-
nated in Personal Influence, a study published by Lazarsfeld and Elihu Katz 
that showed how media messages flowed in two "s teps , " requiring local 
leaders to relay them to the millions. All these studies suggested that 
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persisting subcultures and local loyalties buffered media influence in 
salutary ways, but also helped to convey it.51 
Daniel Bell seized on " the rediscovery of the primary group" to rebut 
allegations that a massified American society was doomed either to 
stagnation or to disintegration. He held that unhomogenized group life 
served to stabilize social progress, by providing citizens with psychological 
anchorages. "Social and cultural change," wrote Bell, "is probably 
greater and more rapid today in the United States than in any other 
country, but the assumption that social disorder and anomie inevitably 
attend such change is not borne out in this case."5 2 Thus Bell inverted the 
judgment of the interwar consensus: the mass society flourishes only to the 
degree that it does not separate or atomize its members. 
But Bell had objectives quite removed from revising the mass society 
theory in light of the latest communications research. During the 1940s 
and '50s anti-communist intellectuals took up the task, begun before the 
war by anti-fascists, of stigmatizing the mass as a culture dish for the 
bacteria of totalitarianism. Bell was one of many who labored to clarify the 
distinction between the American mass and the mobilized European 
crowds that had succumbed to Naziism and Stalinism. Bell's "The Theory 
of Mass Society: A Cri t ique" was first read at an international conference 
in Milan sponsored by the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
For that matter some of the new research in mass communications had 
been supported by the USIA.5 3 By the 1950s studies of the mass society 
had left behind the vague visions of perpetual fluidity cherished by pre-
War progressives. The project of mastering the crowd had passed under 
the discipline not just of empirical research, but of Cold War politics. 
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